I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990s, a visitor to a Japanese derivatives trading floor encountered a large open room full of metal desks and computer screens. At most of these desks, traders hunched over their computers or shouted into their telephones. As the traders at their computers entered into a swap with traders at another bank in New York or London, they scribbled the details of the trade onto a form, then tossed it into a basket at the edge of their desk.
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But a few desks to one side were stacked high with documents and large quantities of paper. Periodically, the people working behind the stacks of documents collected these forms and returned to their desks. Within eyesight of the traders and the manager of the derivatives team, these "documentation people" "papered the trades" as people said. The employees at these desks produced confirmation agreements and sent these to their counterparts at the other bank.
These confirmation documents adhered to a standard format, such that the documentation person's principal task was simply to complete the form, fax it, receive a similar fax from his or her counterpart at the other bank, and file it away. Occasionally, this person might discover discrepancies-misunderstandings between the two parties over the terms, for example-and then would refer these back to the traders to resolve or contact their counterparts at the other bank to resolve the dispute.
Global private law is now the source of both anxiety and euphoria. So-called global private law regimes-private in the sense that they do not rely primarily on the legitimacy or the coercive power of the state for their authority-now fascinate legal theorists for whom the authority, legitimacy, and power of law has long been tethered to the state.' But much of the conversation about global private law proceeds at some distance from the concrete moments, practices, and individuals that constitute global private governance regimes.
In this article, I build upon research in one arena of global private law, the production of legal documentation for the global swap markets, to challenge the way both utopic and dystopic accounts describe private law beyond the state. I argue that these accounts stand on a set of anthropological assumptions or claims-assertions about what this private law actually is, from an insider's point of view, about how it is interpreted and experienced "in the real world"-which for the most part go unexamined, untheorized, and undefended empirically. This matters because they also turn out to be, at the very least, seriously incomplete.
In particular, I want to challenge, or at least complicate, three views of the source of private law's legitimacy that figure prominently in both defenses and critiques of private law: the view that law is an artifact of state power, 2 the view that law enshrines a set of norms, 3 and the view that law is a coherent system of one kind or the way it replicates and hence supersedes the state in practical, mundane, routine ways.
In the sections that follow, I consider how a close-up description of some moments in global private law-making, like the one with which I began, might cause us to rethink the three most prominent assumptions about global private law. I then conclude with some implications for how to think about whether and how global private law might be "beyond the state."
II. RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW AS AN ARTIFACT OF STATE POWER
In order to evaluate and specify the claims often made about global private law, I turn to empirical observations conducted through participant observation in one arena of private governance, the self-regulation of the global swap markets through the posting of collateral in Tokyo. The privately negotiated derivative markets are intended to be the most private of markets. Unlike the futures and options markets, swaps are not traded over an organized exchange. The parties to a swap make their own rules, tailor their own contracts, and above all, privately bear the full risk that one or another will not perform their obligations rather than placing their confidence in the exchange as an intermediary. 8 Since securities regulation law was designed to regulate on-exchange activity, much swap trading falls between the regulatory cracks. 9 When disputes arise, 8 . Ronit and Schneider usefully distinguish between private legal authority which is delegated to the private law-making institution by a state, and private legal authority which is autonomously claimed or built by non-state forces. Karsten Ronit & Volker Schneider, Private Organizations and Their Contribution to Problem-Solving in the Global Arena, in PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 1, 23 (Karsten Ronit &Volker Schneider eds., 2000) . However, they also overstate the distinction where they fail to consider how the actions of private actors exercising regulatory authority outside state action, may in fact constitute a delegation of authority from the state.
9. At present, in the absence of extensive case law or regulatory actions by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, there is some uncertainty about the implications of American securities laws for the derivatives markets. The statutory language (concerning such issues as fraud and insider trading) of the American securities laws is very broadly stated, and designed with the kinds of fraud in mind that would apply to manipulation of on-exchange trading. The case law, likewise, is closely linked to on-exchange transactions. Although solid doctrinal arguments for the application of portions of the securities laws to certain entities in the swap markets could be made, to date, neither the SEC and the CFTC have shown a strong inclination to develop those arguments. Nevertheless, the trading activities of swap partners are subject to various forms of regulation, by virtue of these players' nature as regulated institutions. As Hal Scott points out, however, this can lead to irregular levels of regulation in a market that includes a variety of parties, including banks, securities firms, corporations, hedge funds, governments and individuals:
As a formal matter, the derivatives activities of banks in the United States are highly regulated by bank supervisors. This regulation involves detailed examination of their activities as well as the capital requirements discussed below .... However, there is no regulatory framework for supervision of the therefore, often parties' only option is to bring a lawsuit in a domestic court under ordinary common or civil law claims such as breach of contract, or fraud. 10 Since this is often impractical, the effect is that the parties have relatively little recourse to the state to resolve their internal problems. And this is precisely the appeal of these markets, from participants' point of view. When the documentation people described above were not at work completing and dispatching confirmation forms, they huddled behind piles of binders full of printed forms, dictionaries and pencils in hand, talking on the telephone with colleagues at other banks as they worked through the blanks in the forms. The most common printed form was a standardized "master agreement"" that provides the legal framework for all individual swap transactions between any two banks. It defines key practices, rights and obligations, such as the use of confirmation documents, or the procedures for cashing out obligations in the event of the financial failure of one of the parties.
The form had been produced by representatives of important players in the swap markets, working together under the auspices of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Founded in 1985, ISDA is a private organization of more than 750 over-the-counter derivatives "dealers"-banks and securities firms that are repeat players ("dealers") in the privately negotiated derivatives industry, the market for derivatives that are not traded through an organized exchange.' 2 The master agreement is one of ISDA's early and lasting achievements, and the production of this and other standardized agreements is one of the principal functions of the association. 13 derivatives activities of securities firms by the SEC or the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation (CFTC). Securities firms are not generally regulated for safety and soundness except through capital requirements, and unregistered affiliates of such firms dealing in swaps have not even been subject to capital requirements, until the SEC's proposal in 2003 in response to the EU's Conglomerates Directive. HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 640 (2006) . Banks are subject to capitalization requirements under the terms of the Bank for International Settlements, an international organization of bank regulators. There are also disclosure and accounting rules that apply to public companies.
10. Most of the large lawsuits by users of derivatives against dealers have been brought on common law and statutory grounds such as fraud and failure to disclose material information, or have tested on the argument that the end user plaintiff was prohibited from engaging in derivatives trading. SCOTT, supra note 9, at 663. Although the document standardizes many aspects of the practice of swap trading, it also allows for a certain amount of flexibility and adaptation by its users through a "schedule" at the end in which the parties can specify some of the details to their particular relationship, such as how payments are to be made. Hence the task of the documentation people was to tailor the agreement to the needs of the bank and its counterparties by filling in the blanks in the form.
At first blush, it may seem odd to focus on this kind of legal work as an example of global private law. It has become commonplace in sociolegal studies to focus instead on the "creative capacities of lawyers"14-in bringing clients together, inventing innovative solutions to business problems, pushing the development of law, and hence shaping the character of society. But the rote and repetitive work of the documentation people, defined by its precision and attention to detail rather than its creativity, and by its distance from legal theory, points to another, too little acknowledged modality of legal work.
All this mundane activity is relevant to the nature of global private law and to the question of the extent to which it operates outside or beyond the state in two senses. First, the ISDA master agreement is the work of a powerful global private organization of the kind that is now at the center of many debates about global private law. 15 Second, within the field of global derivatives trading, collateralization is a legal technology that is paradigmatic of global private law solutions. Although collateral is an artifact of multiple kinds of national law, 16 it is also a device for running an end-game around certain aspects of national law. In the event of bankruptcy, collateral gives swap counterparties a mechanism other than the priority system of national bankruptcy laws with its concerns for the interests of third REV. 1075 REV. (2006 .
16. The rights of the collateral holder are a matter of national property, contract and commercial law, and the requirements for giving and taking collateral (for creating a security interest in US parlance), are defined by and vary according to, the terms of local statutory and common law. In the common and civil law traditions alike, collateral has long been recognized as a special kind of property right. Collateral is a species of ius in re aliena in Roman Law, rights in others' property, which parties through which to resolve disputes. 1 7 Collateral is a self-help mechanism: in many jurisdictions the collateral holder may simply keep the collateral to satisfy the debtor's obligations, without going to court."' Collateral emerges as a solution to a practical problem of transnational governance, therefore. The problem is that the terms of the national bankruptcy laws of many of the countries in which derivatives trading occurs and the way these are interpreted and enforced by national bankruptcy judges do not always suit the global derivatives industry because they do not prioritize their claims ahead of others. 19 But collateral has many other advantages other than protection against bankruptcy. For example, it becomes a vehicle for the parties to privately steer their relationship through other turbulent waters: the ISDA Master Agreement lists a number of "events" short of bankruptcy that trigger the collateral holder's right to close out its positions and use the collateral to satisfy any residual debts. 20 170 (1996) . Conflict of laws issues occupied the attention of ISDA legal staff I observed as much as any other area of law. See RILES, supra note 7. Foreign holders of collateral feared that in the event of the bankruptcy of a counterparty in Tokyo, for example, Japanese bankruptcy courts might choose to apply Japanese law and they might not recognize the priority of the collateral transaction over other creditors' claims. §11-27, §11-28, §11-29 (1983) . However, case law diverges from this "to the point where Japanese bankruptcy proceedings affect foreign assets, and foreign bankruptcy proceedings affect assets in Japan." HENDERSON & HATTORI, supra, § 11-28.
28. The transnational nature of collateral transactions goes beyond the mere (but important) fact that the parties to a swap are often incorporated in different jurisdictions. Collateral may be posted in different currencies, or in the form of government bonds issued by different governments. The collateral usually is held with intermediaries often incorporated in yet other jurisdictions, with places of business in still other locales. These intermediaries book the collateral in computerized ledgers maintained on servers that may be located yet elsewhere in the world. And when, as is permitted under the law of some countries, the pledgee (the party which receives the collateral) "repledges" the collateral to yet another party to satisfy its own obligations, which then repledges it again, one gets a picture of a constant global movement of collateral in and out of accounts in many jurisdictions.
Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other Liens in International Bankruptcies, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 165 (1998).
On questions relating to the validity of the collateral, some jurisdictions, following classical private international law rules, look to the law of the place where the securities are held. But doctrine in this area developed to deal with tangible forms of property, such as paper securities. Where "collateral" is in actuality a set of numbers in a computerized account, or in multiple accounts, maintained by multiple intermediaries, the question of where it "is" for the purpose of this analysis is almost metaphysically unanswerable. One resolution adopted by some jurisdictions (including the U.S. in the wake of recent revisions to the UCC, as concerns certain issues) is to look to the law of the place where the intermediary whose account the collateral is held with is located. Richard Potok, Legal Certainty for Securities Held as Collateral, 18 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 12 (1999) . Recent revisions to Article 8 and 9 specifically take the UCC global by addressing questions of choice of law and tailoring the terms to the character of cross-border transactions: The local law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction, as specified in subsection (e), governs: (1) acquisition of a security entitlement from the securities intermediary; (2) the rights and duties of the securities intermediary and entitlement holder arising out of a security entitlement; (3) whether the securities intermediary owes any duties to an adverse claimant to a security entitlement; and (4) whether an adverse claim can be asserted against a person who acquires a security entitlement from the securities intermediary or a person who purchases a security entitlement or interest therein from an entitlement holder. UCC § 8-110 (b). See also U.C.C. art. 9 (1999); 3 U.L.A. 9, 9 (Supp. 1999) (effective July 1, 2001). In some respects, at least, the European Union follows a similar approach. Another approach (adopted in the U.S. by UCC Article 9 with respect to certain issues relating to the validity of the security interest) is to look to the law of the location of the debtor. Ryan E. Bull, Operation of the New Article 9 Choice of Law Regime in an International Context, 78 TEx. L. REV. 679 (2000) . For many (but not all) legal issues surrounding validity, Japanese courts look to the law of the place where the securities were issued. Hideki Kanda, Japan, in CRoss BORDER COLLATERAL: LEGAL RISK AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW 366 (Richard Potok ed., 2002) . And this says nothing about what law would govern the question of the priority of the collateral holder's claim, in the event of bankruptcy. The question of how different national courts with jurisdiction over the assets of a bankrupt company with transnational contacts should coordi-doctrinal problems "touchdown points" in the relationship between global private governance and national law-points at which the efforts of private organizations such as ISDA to achieve "lift-off" from national regimes comes to rest on national law itself.
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But this critique of global private governance is certainly not news to the proponents of global private governance institutions like ISDA. The legal experts with whom I worked understood full well that the private law of collateral is always only a partial global solution to their local legal problems. 3 1 They were intimately aware, for example, that the terms of any collateral agreement must satisfy national requirements for creating a valid and enforceable security interest in order for the lender to be able to use the collateral, or again, that national bankruptcy law must recognize the primacy of the interest of "secured creditors" over other creditors if the collateral agreement is to have force once the debtor has declared bankruptcy. In fact, it was at these junctures that the legal actors I studied labored-these constraints created the legal work for them to do.
For example, where the terms in ISDA's standardized documents conflict with the norms enshrined in national statutory or judgemade law, ISDA actively works to supplant or change the latter so that it conforms to the former. ISDA hires local lawyers to investigate discrepancies between the terms of ISDA documents and national law, and where necessary, to lobby national governments to change national law to either conform to the terms of the Master Agreement nate, and when they should defer to the law of another jurisdiction, remains very much unresolved. or explicitly declare the ISDA documents enforceable. 3 2 Partly at the urging of ISDA, and with active input from the organization, several transnational bodies are busy creating substantive legal rules concerning collateral that would apply in multiple jurisdictions and supersede national law. ISDA has pressed for the creation of a treatyperhaps the ultimate example of global state law-that would mandate that national judges respect private parties' right to choose whatever law they wish to have applied to their collateral agreements. 33 In response to lobbying from ISDA, 34 the European Union has adopted a Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements defining how security interests are to be created in EU Member States, and the rights of holders of collateral. 3 5 And ISDA has also worked with UNIDROIT, the international body devoted to unifying private law globally, 3 6 on a Convention on Harmonised Substantive Rules re-32. In the United States, intensive lobbying on the part of ISDA has resulted in important revisions of New York state law, the UCC, and the national bankruptcy law, and has averted other proposed regulation opposed by ISDA. The European Union also has responded to ISDA lobbying by producing a directive on collateral supported by ISDA. In Tokyo, likewise, ISDA has an elaborate system of committees in place to address legal reforms as well as high-level contacts in all branches of the Japanese bureaucracy. The representatives of even the foreign banks at ISDA Tokyo meetings are almost exclusively Japanese employees of these foreign banks, graduates of top universities with connections to former teachers and classmates in the bureaucracy and on the bench.
33. On December 13, 2002, the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted a Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary, available at http://www.hcch.netlindexen.php?act= conventions.text&cid=72. This convention, a product of intensive lobbying by ISDA and other global commercial groups, affirms that if the agreement between the intermediary and the custodian of the security specifies which law should apply, that law applies as long as it bears a reasonable relationship to the transaction. The first order principle of the convention is the freedom of the account holder and intermediary (but not the pledgor and pledgee) to choose the applicable law by contract. Groups such as ISDA participated actively in the drafting of the convention. The Hague Conference official with primary responsibility for its drafting defends this freedom of contract principle on grounds that states have an interest in economic development, and in supporting "certainty in the marketplace promoted by the Convention. This is not a case of private versus public interest. The Convention itself represents a clear decision by the state that the public interest resides in enforcement of the Convention's rule. has not yet come into force. Even if the question of which law governs the collateral agreement is ultimately settled by treaty, this will not resolve the question of the relationship between the law of collateral and national bankruptcy law: it will not preclude a Japanese bankruptcy court for example from recognizing the collateral as valid under New York law as specified by the CSA, but then applying Japanese bankruptcy law to the question of whether the collateral holder should be able to keep the collateral after a bankruptcy filing.
34 What Wai views as "touchdown points," then, were for my informants, projects-problems that demanded creative work, political mobilization, technical skill, and considerable devotion. What is interesting about typical artifacts of private global governance such as collateral, when viewed in practice, is not whether they are truly private (and outside the purview of the state), or actually public (and within state control), but rather how the impulse, the fantasy of a private market engenders particular kinds of practical projects, particular registers of engagement between lawyers working for private parties under the umbrella of transnational organizations such as ISDA, national and international law-makers, judges, and regulators.
Moreover, the view that private law is just a pass through to state power overlooks the role of the materiality of ISDA forms in the global private governance regime. The rhetorical force of the argument that judges will wreak chaos on the markets if they fail to honor market practices is perhaps different because of the sheer physical ubiquity of these documents. For example, in the early 1990s, the ISDA Master Agreement's procedures for closing out the agreement in the case of the bankruptcy of one party, and its delineation of the rights of the other party in such a scenario, arguably conflicted with the substantive rules and procedures of many national bankruptcy regimes. However, interviews suggest that the widespread use of the Master Agreement-the physical existence of thousands of such signed documents-transformed the question of what to do about substantive legal rules that industry members found unfavorable, a policy question, into a far more general and technical question of the enforceability of this contract in each national jurisdiction. The sociological fact that material documents matter admittedly flies in the face of the longstanding assertion that the paper of the contract means nothing in itself, that it is the agreement between the parties, and not the document, that matters. 39 But commentators have begun to pay attention to the consequences of standardized contracts such as ISDA documents for the authority, legitimacy and power of privatized law in a global market. 40 Some even celebrate these standardized contracts as examples of "the changing paradigm of international commercial law" towards "privatized law-making." 4 1
And indeed, for ISDA staff and members, collateral documents are crucial technologies of private transnational legal infrastructure-devices through which particular technical, institutional, political, legal, and economic arrangements gain solidity and durability. 4 2 This is not to say that judges do not understand that a privately created document is legally meaningful only to the extent that a state-sanctioned court holds it to be enforceable. But what empirical observation of private law in action demonstrates is that in order for the transaction to "work" all sides (parties and judges alike) must be both aware of the "truth" that state power lies behind all private legal regimes and able to momentarily forget this fact to immerse themselves the practical and technical day to day experience of doing private law. 551 (1968) . He emphasized the aura of "realism" about this "unifying activity" owing to the fact that the rules are created by the business community rather than by government. Id. at 555. Ralf Michaels has recently analyzed these issues as a matter of the accommodation of global private law regimes by the state. Michaels usefully dissects these forms of accommodation into three distinct kinds, all of which enter into play in standardized contracts-deference, incorporation, and delegation. gitimacy of "law" by virtue of the fact that they embody a set of particular norms. 44 These norms are imagined to be analogous, both in their coercive power and their legitimacy, to the authority of the state, within the purview of the particular community or market sector where they apply. For the proponents of private law, the rise of private norm-making organizations is a cause for celebration because of the efficiencies and creative regulatory solutions that such private organizations are deemed to provide. There is even an aura of democratization in phrases like "bottom-up lawmaking" used to describe the global production of private law norms. 45 Implicit in or running alongside this view is often a mild materialist claim that a revolution in information technologies and in the character of capitalism has occurred, resulting in a largely inevitable trend toward the demise of state law-making authority. 46 But the view of global private law as a regime of norms is equally pervasive among those who critique the delegation of state power to global private authorities. The theorist of globalization Saskia Sassen for example laments that we now face, "a normative transformation in the [sense] of a privatizing of certain capacities for making norms." 47 The notion that communities-in this case communities of global market players-solve their problems and order their behavior by creating norms is a longstanding tenet of functionalist anthropology and one that has had an important shelf life in twentieth century legal scholarship. 4 s In some versions of this dogma, one particularly prevalent in law and society scholarship, social networks serve the same kinds of results as state coercion, and social norms are the prod-44. Klaus Peter Berger for example writes that business people "create their own law through the drafting, use and refinement of general conditions of trade, standardized contracts and other clauses as well as the development of practices and usages, elevating them from regional to world-wide customs." BERGER, supra note 41, at 27-28. In contrast, the fact that these global norms are "spontaneously generated" and not the product of purposeful law-making activity has led one commentator to doubt whether they are coherent enough to constitute a source of law. ucts of social networks. 4 9 In other versions-ones influenced by Hayekian social thought-the spontaneous quality of norms makes them both more efficient and more just. 50 The deeper assumption here is that norms and communities are more "real" than the law of the state because they form a context for the law of the state, and context is always more stable and determinate than text. 5 1 The socio-legal literature, for example, seeks to demonstrate time and again that the real source of security of contract in the global marketplace is not legal institutions but private networks built on relations of trust among global elites. 52 To the extent that these regimes are read as systems of private norms, they appear as self evidently more real, more legitimate, more innovative, more complex, closer to the ground, than the state itself.
49. Many political scientists and lawyers see private norms as more "complex" and "heterodox" than state law because each industry makes its own norms and hence the result is a pluralistic legal order with no clear hierarchies of norms. See Cerny, supra note 46, at 60. In place of national legal systems, these theorists see coexisting, fragmented, sometimes integrated, sometimes conflicting normative orders with different degrees of access to coercive authority-of the state and other coercive forces in society. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, for example, states that "a legal field is a constellation of different legalities (and illegalities) operating in local, national and global time-spaces." BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE:
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 85 (2002).
In a previous project on global public law, I have critiqued this propensity to see networks everywhere and to view these as inherently normatively good. ANNELISE RILES, Soc. 406 (1999) . Specifically, both socio-legal studies and the social studies of finance have emphasized the way social relations can substitute for the impossible demands for information required to effectively police one's agreements in the global marketplace. The argument is that small "clubs" of actors come to know and trust one another intimately, and to develop a rich network of norms governing their transactions, such that very locally defined social relations of trust and informal norms come to substitute for both financial knowledge and legal norms. From this vantage point, it is easy enough to see why global private governance regimes would seem to pose such a threat to state legitimacy. But does this description of global private law as a collection of norms, and of organizations such as ISDA as norm creators, accurately capture the knowledge work at issue, or does it obscure as much as it reveals? From an empirical perspective, there is something amiss in the descriptions of global private governance as alternative normative communities busy codifying their norms in standardized documents.
In legal terms, collateral is a body of doctrines and theories, a specialized set of property rights. In Tokyo, legal academics, and qualified lawyers working closely with them inside prestigious law firms, read and wrote academic articles about the meaning of the sections of the Civil Code governing collateral relations, and they applied these to collateral in the derivatives markets in legal opinions drafted on behalf of their clients (in particular the foreign banks). Government bureaucrats studied foreign laws, debated law reform projects, drafted new laws, and implemented existing ones.
But as explained above, in the financial markets, one first encounters "collateral" as a mountain of specific pre-printed forms that must be completed and filed before trading can begin, and of confirmation documents that must be exchanged after each trade. What ISDA members, through the battalions of documentation people I studied were busy making were not rules, not norms, not sources of law, but documents.
Legal scholars have read such contracts for their meaning-they have treated them as texts that entextualize particular sets of norms. 53 But such forms are often meant not to be read, but to be completed. That is, ISDA documents are technologies that compel a very specific kind of activity, form-filling. 54 ISDA form is a script for a particular kind of collaboration between two parties-the documentation person at Bank A and the documentation person at Bank B.
53. Two recent empirical papers present material that hints at trouble for the view of standardized contracts as mere vessels of narrative meaning. Choi and Gulati make the interesting claim that some terms of boilerplate often have no clear meaning even among industry members. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 REV. (2006 . Boilerplate does not necessarily enshrine clearly accepted norms, in other words. Unfortunately, rather than push the standardized contracts literature to come to terms with this empirical insight, the authors seek to do away with the trouble this finding causes by proposing a theory of interpretation of these documents that would read industry norms back in. Likewise, Gelpern and Gulati present a fascinating account of how a clause in a standardized sovereign debt contacts came to be changed: despite the extensive work devoted to this change, industry participants insisted that the change mattered little in the end. We find that the ability of professions to exercise lawmaking power in an area such as bankruptcy law increases significantly when agenda setting, inventing and drafting new laws, and legislative politicking takes place underneath the wider horizon of political debate. Politics take place at two levels: when it is above the political horizon, it activates all the forces and counterforces of the political system and thus imports into technical or financial law reform a much wider set of issues than pertain to the substantive and administrative core of the reform itself; this also activates classic patterns of oppositionalism. When it is below the political horizon, it is not widely debated; it does not stir public controversy; it does not activate usual interest group polarities and conflicts; and it does not trigger instinctive party political opposition. Below the horizon, professions can exert much more influence, and they do so characteristically by insisting that their con- another. 58 The documentation people I worked with did not belong to any such "club"-their counterparties were simply anonymous voices on the other end of a telephone, or people on the other end of the fax or e-mail. 5 9 This routine is made possible not by a set of shared norms, but by a given set of aesthetic criteria-printed forms are distinguished from other genres of communication such as letters, legal opinions, or e-mail messages by their very rigid aesthetic standards. 60 These aesthetic criteria in turn demand that the users of the forms engage in very specific forms of behavior: one chooses the law that applies to the ISDA master agreement by circling the proper word; one delineates who is the responsible contact person for the agreement by completing the relevant box. The form is not set out to be read; it is presumed that the "users" (the term is significant) will jump to the blanks and complete them, most likely in the order they appear. The collaboration made possible by the printed form is certainly consequential, in other words, but it is also normatively and socially thin. 6 1 In other words, "collateral" is not just an artifact of private networks and associated normative communities but a technology, and a technical form of agency, of its own.
Many law and society scholars will insist that the claim that the law functions independently of social context is nothing but a phantasmic assertion or worse, a political obfuscation. 62 My own first entree into the larger significance of collateral for a theory of legal knowledge came from what I took to be just such obfuscation: my informants' manifest lack of interest in the subject of disputes. As a legal anthropologist, I am predisposed to take an interest in disputes and cultures of disputing, and so I naturally peppered my informants with questions about how disputes among counterparties over the terms of a swap get resolved. Given the notional amounts at stake, I reasoned that these disputes must occupy considerable effort and energy. To my dismay, however, these questions elicited little interest on the part of the documentation people I knew. "We just work these things out," I was told again and again, with a standard shrug, before people turned the conversation back to subjects of greater concern to them. When, confident that people were hiding something, I pointed 58. See Levit, supra note 22, at 131. 59. One could say that the users of ISDA forms share a set of institutional practices, codes of behavior, by virtue of the fact of their employment in particular kinds of institutions (e.g., banks and securities firms). But this simply restates the argument here: ISDA forms are one important material instantiation of this institutional practice.
60 out that the ISDA CSA documents provide for a quite elaborate set of procedures to be followed in the event of a dispute, people laughed. No one actually followed those procedures, I was told. Rather, people tended to have in mind a range within which, should a dispute arise, they would simply go along and not contest. If the disputed amount was outside that range, they would simply come to some agreement, usually by splitting the difference. At one point, one informant told me, it was suggested that a more formal dispute resolution mechanism should be set up, but the idea was abandoned because "nobody wanted to serve on it." There are also remarkably few examples of formal litigation among swap parties.
To grasp the theoretical significance of this fact, compare collateral with a favorite subject in the theory of global private law, international commercial arbitration. Arbitration is theoretically interesting for socio-legal scholars because we can see in it private actors banding together, elaborating their own dispute resolution system, developing over time their own body of adjudicative norms, and increasingly, garnering state approval for these norms. That is, arbitration is interesting in a somewhat obvious way, because it is quite explicitly an analog to state law, an alternative to state law with all of state law's functional elements-a regime of norms, a set of procedures, a set of problems (disputes). But collateral works according to a quite different logic. In theory at least, if a transaction is collateralized, there is no need for dispute resolution in the first place. The dispute is already resolved, already collateralized, so to speak, before it ever comes into existence. And just because things do not turn out so neatly in practice does not mean that we should ignore the fantasy, the ambition, the hope of collateral.
From this point of view, we might view collateral arrangements as a form of law that aims to be both the obviation of dispute resolution as well as its apotheosis. Indeed, collateral is difficult to be seen as a "topic" of legal theory precisely because its modus operandi is not at all alternative and analogous to standard law, with its disputes resolved according to norms enshrined in legal processes.
If this point is difficult to accept from a socio-legal point of view in which law is always a (less legitimate) artifact of (more authentic) social relations, it is, I think, very much part of the lawyer's common sense understanding of the law. In practitioners' own ideology, collateral is as a way of setting limits on the messy complexities of a global market, a way of obviating the need for knowledge and trust, an alternative to developing shared private norms. One could say that in fact collateral is the precise opposite of social norms. That is, collateral aspires to make it possible for global actors to deal with one another without trust, without shared norms, without a thick web of personal relations or an elaborate alternative system of dispute resolution.
IV. RETHINKING THE VIEW OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW AS A
COHERENT OR STANDARDIZED SYSTEM I have argued thus far that critiques of global private law as an artifact of state power miss the extent to which that the interface between private authority and state power is itself the very basis for the flurry of activity that is global private law, from an empirical vantage point. And on the other side of the ledger, I have argued that utopic and dystopic accounts of global private law that see in it a spontaneous and more legitimate set of norms fail to account for the fact that private law is not just a set of norms but a set of knowledge practices. I now want to take on one last source of global private law's legitimacy, the question of its coherence-analytical or sociological. This brings us to a conversation about practices of standardization.
The standardized quality of law-making has recently captured the attention of law and economics and law and society scholars alike. Where law and economics scholars see cost savings, 63 socio-legal scholars see the production of new legal regimes through the routinization of work and professional roles. 64 Standardization is also a central concern of science and technology studies scholars for whom standards produce epistemic networks-collections of projects, associated ideas and technologies for working on them, and ultimately, the "truths" that emerge from these. 65 63. A core insight of the law and economics literature on standardized contracts is that standardization serves the important economic function of reducing the transaction costs associated with producing new contracts, such as researching the law and drafting the terms of the contract ("learning benefits"). Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-20 (1997) . For example, Kahan and Klausner point out that standardized contracts also reduce litigation costs because they deploy terms that have already been vetted in court. Id.
64. For example, Mark Suchman, working in the domestic American context of the development of intellectual property law in Silicon Valley, draws attention to mundane practices of contract production as one source, among others, of the creation of new legal norms. Suchman points to "a significant but often overlooked aspect of industrial governance: the routinization of transactional practices within a develop- 65. Science studies scholars have argued that scientific truths and economic markets are artifacts of networks of theories, ideas, people, institutions, machines, and Built into all of these arguments is the notion of a network of actors who share certain abilities to signal to one another and to learn from one another. 6 6 In this sense, the standardization vocabulary is a richer and more empirical way of arguing for what legal scholars used to call the coherence of law. By discovering networks of material and conceptual kinds, scholars are able to show that the "stuff' of documents, of doctrine, of mundane legal knowledge actually "adds up" to a larger whole, something of much greater significance. A document gains theoretical significance by virtue of its status as a node in a larger standardized network of forms of expertise. A network in turn gains theoretical significance by virtue of its status as the accumulation of concrete practices, all related into a whole. 6 7 This vision of the world not as a system of states but as a myriad networks-whether these be networks of economic actors or networks of doctrines and documents-is an attractive argument for the legitimacy and authority of private law beyond the state. 68 But does the claim that the disparate and mundane bits of legal knowledge add up to a new kind of whole do justice to the perspective of the actors themselves? Where the theorists may see connections everywhere, the actors involved are just as likely to see breaks, divides, a lack of connections. To take their perspective seriously is to ponder the ways often nothing in particular is being "constructed" by these practicesthe way they do not add up to a coherent whole.
First, as any comparative lawyer would immediately understand, the standardization of ISDA documents did not in any way guarantee their transnational transplantability. 69 Rather, the trans- latability of these documents required the work of particular experts, the documentation people. The institutional venue for the transplantation of this foreign legal regime to the Japanese market were the meetings of a "documentation committee" of back-office staff from various Japanese and foreign banks sponsored by ISDA Tokyo. At these meetings, back office staff discussed the details of form filling with an aim to "standardize" and "create protocols" for form-filling, where the terms of the forms laden with assumptions about market practices in the American and British markets raised problems or made nonsensical assumptions in the context of the Japanese market. For example, the New York documents prescribed that collateral should be transferred within three days, as was the practice in New York, but at the time, neither the Japanese banks nor the clearing system for Japanese Government Bonds maintained by the Bank of Japan was sophisticated enough to achieve this. From documentation people's point of view, the discontinuities between the bits and pieces of the global network were as apparent and salient as the connections.
Likewise, commentators on private law have repeatedly commented on its scholastic quality and of the break between theory and practice this scholasticism necessarily implies. 70 As an empirical matter this break between the scholastic and private law worlds was a central effect of the package of doctrines and documents that made up collateral. Expertise consisted of two sides. Some experts, the "more academic," prototypically, university professors, made theories. Others, "the practicing lawyers," completed documents. The documents and theories generated a bifurcated legal field-a field characterized by divisions of status and expertise rather than networked connections.
Moreover, to flatten out the distinction between theory and practice, and to see practical legal work as simply an instantiation of legal theory and doctrine, that is, to see legal theorists and legal practitioners as working with one coherent network of legal concepts, overlooks the important practical work done by the distinction between theory and material document in actual legal practice. Let me give one concrete example of what I mean. Sometimes filling in the collateral forms presented what my informants described as "difficult problems." Swap trading partners-foreign swap partners-wished to have extensive rights concerning the collateral of Japanese banks they held. 71 They wanted to be able to sell the collateral to a third party, or again to use it as collateral of their own in future swap 70. See. e.g transactions. 72 And these "difficult problems" raised further questions of theory and doctrine. American and UK law allowed for this so-called rehypothecation, but the law of Japan provided that the holder of collateral had certain duties of care and hence could not alienate the collateral without the permission of the party that had initially posted it. 73 One threshold legal question therefore was what country's law would govern the rights over collateral posted by a Japanese bank with an American bank, for example-Japanese or American law. The full answer to this legal question involves complex and murky jurisprudential and even epistemological issues (what law should govern a transaction between a Japanese and UK bank, posted to their subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands, involving a swap of Chinese currency for Singaporean currency? And given that in most legal systems the law traditionally attempts to answer such questions in territorial terms, where did the transaction take place? Where is the collateral, some numbers in some accounts, "held"?) But the lawyers at ISDA headquarters in New York had prescribed a simple solution grounded not in legal theory but in concrete practices of documentation. These lawyers had produced a "collateral annex" 75 to the ISDA Master Agreement which included, among other things, a clause specifying that the parties agreed in advance that all disputes over collateral should be governed by either UK or New York law. The form simply required documentation people to circle "law of New York" or "law of the United Kingdom," to initial the document signaling their assent, and to file it. 7 6 In other words, the perception of a difference between a document and a theory-even if all would agree at another level of argument that the document is just an instantiation of a theory-"cut the network" 77 of legal theorizing. Sometimes crude commonsense distinctions between the ontological status of theories and objects have their practical uses. In this case, it provided a way out of doctrinal debates which ISDA lawyers understood to be endless. From a broader theoretical vantage point, we could say much of the same about the relationship between law and other forms of expertise in the financial markets. It is common in Weberian and science studies inspired work on markets to think about law as a form of technocratic expertise, alongside economics. In this understanding, lawyers are experts because they have access to a specialized body of knowledge that allows them to make connections and serve as brokers of various kinds. The science studies literature emphasizes the way disparate forms of expertise (such as law and finance) are able to come together through material technologies such as documents that translate between them. But this picture of smooth translatability and collaboration between law and finance does not sit well with the experience of the documentation people I knew. One of the features of the work of the documentation people was that it locked them into a relationship with a set of concepts, machines and persons which they were acutely aware they did not understand-into a relationship premised on a lack of knowledge. As lawyers, they were intensely aware that they did not understand the mathematical details of collateral valuation, for example, nor did they understand the humans and machines that performed these calculations. And yet the work of documentation depended in concrete and ubiquitous ways on valuation. And in fact this disconnect between traders and lawyers (later mandated by financial regulators who insisted, as part of market reforms, that lawyers be physically moved to a different space, the "back office" where they might be even more independent from traders) was precisely their added value within the institution. Part of what rendered the documentation people experts was their lack of knowledge of certain aspects of the financial markets. I believe this is an observation that has some generalizability: in a global market in which information overload is the taken for granted starting point, it is easy to see how value is attributed to a practice that steps back, that makes the picture simple by shutting out all the detail. 78 The market value of private law, we might say, resides not so much in its ability 
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In place of networks of people, institutions, objects, experts, and ideas that create coherent standards, new forms of transparency, communities of expertise, and truths, one coherent doctrinal or sociological whole, then, we have pockets of lack of knowledge, breaks between theory and practice, genres of opacity, differences in ontological status, lack of understanding of the agency and expertise of others. We have a flurry of activity that creates distinctions, sets limits, cuts one genre of thought and one line of analysis from another, activity that is not building anything in particular, that does not "add up" to a new legal regime, or a new market sphere, or a new source of epistemological or juridical authority. I call this "private law as Anti-Network" to distinguish it from the range of pictures of private law that focus on networks and connections of one kind or another.
IV. THE ANTI-NETWORK AND THE STATE
This brings me to the mutually derived legitimacy of private law and the state. Most theorists of global private governance focus on the emergence of a new set of parallel norms, customs, and rules, or a new set of social relations, institutions and practices, outside the purview of the state, as a threat to the legitimacy of the state. But as we saw, collateral is something quite distinct from a set of customs and norms. It is a device for privately making the very need for norms go away: global actors seek to take their disputes out of the hands of national regulation and dispose of them before they ever come to be.
Ironically, there are certain parallels here with the knowledge practices that constitute the state. The state is not just the expression of a set of political norms, nor is it just the institutionalization of a set of communities, networked or otherwise. Neither is it a coherent system. Rather, the practice of making distinctions, compartmentalizing, cutting off and setting limits is an exercise in creating and manipulating legitimacy that has also long been one of the privileges, and the contributions, the knowledge practices of the state. This is what we mean by bureaucratization and proceduralism, the hallmarks of the modern state-a set of scripts or routines for cutting off, compartmentalizing, and hence channeling politics. Viewed from this perspective, global private law is not a radical departure from state law, but really more of the same.
The question of the legitimacy of both private law and the state is usually addressed at a theoretical or political level of analysis, but the above point suggests that it is worth addressing it at a very mundane techno-sociological level as well. That is, we may wish to think of the production of legitimacy as a set of technical practices of com-munication and associated expectations. 79 For example, the materiality of ISDA forms, discussed above, plays a concrete role in the private quality of collateral as a regime of global private governance. Collateral then is a set of material and theoretical knowledge practices, a documentary regime that compels certain forms of legal collaboration according to carefully scripted routines, and that in turn creates certain specific kinds of legitimacy.
The larger point I wish to make is this: the "threat" of private law devices such as collateral to the state, if any, inheres in the way they appropriate and redeploy the very knowledge practices that characterize the modern state, not in the way they appeal to norms outside or beyond these. We have then a condition in which the state is not so much challenged as mirrored, reflected, and deflected in new technical forms. [Vol. 56
